State Proceedings Afforded Res Judicata Effect in Subsequent Civil Rights Action Brought Under Section 1981 (Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co.) by Lesser, David
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 52 
Number 2 Volume 52, Winter 1978, Number 2 Article 13 
July 2012 
State Proceedings Afforded Res Judicata Effect in Subsequent 
Civil Rights Action Brought Under Section 1981 (Mitchell v. 
National Broadcasting Co.) 
David Lesser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Lesser, David (1978) "State Proceedings Afforded Res Judicata Effect in Subsequent Civil Rights Action 
Brought Under Section 1981 (Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co.)," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 52 : No. 2 
, Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss2/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
STATE PROCEEDINGS AFFORDED RES JUDICATA EFFECT IN SUBSEQUENT
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 1981
Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co.
For the victim of racially discriminatory employment practices,
several forums are available in which relief may be sought.' At the
state level, legislative schemes typically establish fair employment
practice agencies which attempt to settle disputes without resort to
the courts.2 In addition, Congress has provided access to the federal
courts through section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 18663 and Title
I See generally 2 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGrS
(1970); Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Comparative Evalua-
tion of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455 (1971).
2 As of 1977, 44 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment and creating procedures by which victims
may seek redress. See [1977] 8A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 451:102-:103. Administration of these
laws is effected through state agencies typically empowered to eliminate discriminatory prac-
tices by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. See Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimina-
tion in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. REV. 455, 490 (1971).
In New York, for example, the Human Rights Law, codified in the New York Executive Law,
provides for preliminary review of a claim of discrimination by the State Division of Human
Rights. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. Pam. 1972-1977). A determination
of the State Division may be appealed, first to the Human Rights Appeal Board, id. § 297-
a(6)(c), and then to the appellate division of the supreme court, id. § 298.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
Section 1981 was originally enacted as part of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of
April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. For over 100 years it was thought that the Act of 1866
only prohibited discrimination by persons acting under color of state law. Larson, The Devel-
opment of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56, 57 & n.6 (1972). Indeed, in 1948 the Supreme Court indicated
that § 1982, which also is derived from § 1 of the 1866 statute, is applicable only to instances
of state action. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948). In 1968, however, the Court reexamined
congressional intent and concluded that § 1982 was applicable to private acts of discrimina-
tion in the sale of housing. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Relying on the
holding in Jones, the courts of appeals have uniformly recognized that § 1981, as part of the
same legislation, is applicable to private acts of discrimination in employment. See, e.g.,
Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1976); Gresham v.
Chambers, 501 F.2d 687, 690 (2d Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th
Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady
v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1385 (4th Cir.) (Dupree, J., concurring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Because of the availability of
both federal and state avenues of relief, the question arises whether
a determination at the state level should foreclose subsequent litiga-
tion of the same claim in a federal forum. Addressing this issue in
the context of a Title VII suit, several federal courts have indicated
that prior state proceedings will not bar a later federal action under
405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co. 438 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir. 1971);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 481-
83 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). Recently, the Supreme Court expressly
adopted the rationale of this line of decisions. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454, 459-60 (1975). For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1981, see Note, Civil Rights
Act of 1866-New Strength for an Old Law, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 284, 285-90 (1968); Comment,
Racial Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 23 Sw. L.J. 373, 376-79 (1969);
Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 615, 617-19 (1969).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 2000e-2, which prohibits
discriminatory employment practices, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race
Id. § 2060e-2(a)(1) (1970). The legislative history of Title VII has been examined in numerous
articles. See, e.g., Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966).
Several years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the question arose
whether Title VII had effectively repealed the provisions of § 1981. As no support for any
repeal theory could be gleaned from the legislative history of Title VII, proponents of the
repeal viewpoint were consistently defeated. See, e.g., Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d
621, 623 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760-61
(3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970). The
commentators agreed that repeal was not intended. E.g., Larson, The Development of Section
1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 56, 65 (1972); Note, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title WI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1236; Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 621-37 (1969).
Although it is not certain that Congress recognized the availability of § 1981 as an avenue
of relief when Title VII was being debated, support for rejection of the repeal argument may
be found in the Congressional Record. In 1964, an amendment was introduced in the Senate
establishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which had been cre-
ated by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. V 1975), as the exclusive agency for the
investigation and remediation of employment discrimination. The amendment was defeated
by a large margin. 110 CONG. REC. 13650-51 (1964). Thus, Congress impliedly indicated that
the procedures outlined in Title VII were not meant to be a substitute for other available
avenues of relief. Moreover, in 1972 Congress rejected a proposed amendment which would
have effectively repealed § 1981. 110 CONG. REc. 3373 (1972). One Senator who objected to
the amendment stated that its passage would repeal the first major piece of civil rights
legislation in our nation's history and concluded that "[t]he law against employment dis-
crimination did not begin with Title VII . . . nor is it intended to end with it." Id. at 3371
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
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that statute.' Recently, however, in Mitchell v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., I the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff who has sought and
obtained state court review of an adverse state administrative deter-
mination is precluded from pursuing a subsequent action in federal
court under section 1981.1
Employed by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) in an
administrative capacity, plaintiff Mitchell, a black woman, was dis-
charged "allegedly because of her poor work performance and un-
cooperative attitude. ' '8 Pursuant to the New York Human Rights
Law,9 Mitchell, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint with the State
Division of Human Rights alleging that she had been discriminated
against by NBC and several of its employees on the basis of her
race. 10 Following an investigation, the Regional Director of the State
Division dismissed the complaint, finding that there existed no
probable cause to believe NBC had engaged in a discriminatory
practice." An evenly divided Human Rights Appeal Board af-
firmed.' 2 With the assistance of counsel, Mitchell petitioned the
' See Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
928 (1975); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide
Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Benneci v. Department
of Labor, 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Young v. South Side Packing Co., 369 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Carrion v. New York Univ., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5992 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration decision will not bar Title VII
claim).
553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g 418 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 266. Ms. Mitchell initially had been placed on probation by the National Broad-
casting Company (NBC) for a period of 30 days. NBC claimed that she was fired at the end
of that period because her attitude had failed to improve. Id.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. Pam. 1972-1977).
1o 553 F.2d at 266-67 & n.2. Within 180 days of the filing of a complaint alleging dis-
crimination, the State Division of Human Rights is required to determine "whether there is
probable cause to believe that the person named in the complaint . . . has engaged or is
engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(2) (McKinney Supp.
Pam. 1972-1977). If the State Division finds no probable cause, the complaint is dismissed.
Should probable cause be found, however, the State Division is authorized to attempt to
eliminate the discriminatory practice by "conference, conciliation and persuasion." Id. §
297(3)(a) (McKinney 1972). The State Division will hold a public hearing if the complaint
has not been dismissed or a settlement has not been reached within 270 days of filing. Id. §
297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. Pam. 1972-1977).
1 553 F.2d at 267. The State Division's investigation consisted of two informal confer-
ences at which oral testimony was taken and interdepartmental correspondence submitted
by NBC. Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
2 553 F.2d at 267. The State Human Rights Appeal Board has the authority to "affirm,
remand, or reverse any order of the division" it finds to be arbitrary, capricious, or not
"supported by substantial evidence on the whole record." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297-a(7)(d)-(e)
(McKinney 1972).
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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York to set aside
the Appeal Board's order. In a unanimous decision, the appellate
division upheld the administrative determination. 13 Plaintiff there-
upon commenced a section 1981 action in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, relying upon judicial decisions
which have interpreted that section to proscribe discrimination in
private employment." The district court granted NBC's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the state proceedings were
entitled to res judicata effect and thus served as a bar to a new
action under section 1981.15
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Mitchell argued that the de-
sirability of initial resort to state conciliatory machinery in the civil
rights area militated against affording state proceedings res judicata
effect. In addition, she alleged that the state proceedings did not
provide a "'full and fair opportunity to litigate her claim.' "I16 Judge
Mishler, writing for the majority, 7 noted that the doctrine of res
judicata is a means by which duplicative litigation is prevented.
11 553 F.2d at 267. The appeal was brought pursuant to N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 298 (McKinney
1972), and N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977-1978). For a
discussion of the appellate division's scope of review, see note 59 and accompanying text infra.
" 418 F. Supp. 462. See note 3 supra. Prior to the affirmance by the Appeal Board,
Mitchell had filed a complaint with the EEOC in accordance with the requirements of Title
VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975). 553 F.2d at 268. Approximately 3 months
after the appellate division's decision, the EEOC issued a finding of no probable cause and
sent Mitchell a letter informing her of her right to commence an action under Title VII. Id.
at 268. Title VII provides that an action thereunder must be commenced within 90 days of
receipt of this letter. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Since Mitchell's claim in the
instant § 1981 action was filed 9 months after receipt of her right-to-sue letter, her Title
VII claim was time-barred and therefore not asserted in the complaint.
25 418 F. Supp. at 464. The district court found Mitchell's reliance on an analogous Title
VII case to be misplaced. Title VII, the court stated, provides a separate and independent
remedy. Therefore, questions concerning § 1981 "must be examined largely without refer-
ences to the Title VII procedures." Id. at 463. Finding that Mitchell had been afforded an
adequate opportunity in the state forums to litigate her claim, the court concluded that those
proceedings would preclude a further action. Id. at 464.
's 553 F.2d at 268.
27 District Judge Mishler, sitting by designation, was joined by Circuit Judge Lumbard
in the majority opinion. Circuit Judge Feinberg dissented.
11 553 F.2d at 268. The purposes and application of the judicially created doctrine of res
judicata were succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 597 (1948):
The general rule of resjudicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause
of action. It rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy
favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that
when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits
of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound
Accord, Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudel, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974).
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Examining the Mitchell situation to ascertain whether res judicata
could be properly applied, the court noted that the parties and
issues in the federal suit were identical to those in the state action."9
Judge Mishler observed, moreover, that since the Human Rights
Law explicitly barred a new action on the same claim once a deci-
sion of the State Division has been reviewed by the appellate divi-
sion,2" the New York courts would treat the state proceedings as
final and binding.' While these factors normally would dictate that
further litigation be barred, the Second Circuit pointed out that,
where state administrative proceedings are involved, it is particu-
larly important to evaluate the type of procedures conducted to
ensure that the claim has been "fully and fairly adjudicated on its
legal or factual merits."22 The majority resolved this issue by draw-
ing an analogy between the probable cause determination made by
the State Division and the disposition of a motion for summary
judgment in the federal courts. In both situations, Judge Mishler
observed, dismissal will result if the complaint is found to lack merit
as a matter of law." Although dismissal on the legal merits of the
complaint forecloses the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing,
the Mitchell court declared, the claimant's "right to a day in court"
does not invariably include the right to a formal hearing.24
As an independent ground for its holding, the Second Circuit
noted that Title 28, United States Code, section 1738, imposes an
1 553 F.2d at 268-70.
2 Id. at 273. The Human Rights Law provides that resort to the administrative proce-
dures contained therein, when pursued to a final determination, precludes any other action
on the same grievance. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 300 (McKinney 1972).
21 553 F.2d at 269.
2 Id. at 270. The court added that since application of res judicata in this case would
have the effect of barring a civil rights claim, an inflexible application of that doctrine would
be undesirable. Id. at 269.
Id. at 270-71.
2, Id. at 271 (citing Olsen v. Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 117 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1941)).
The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the decision of the State Division had received
an automatic affirmance by the Appeal Board and the appellate division. Judge Mishler
found that the appellate division has consistently applied a standard of review which consid-
ers the legal merits of the complaint, therefore, that court's review was sufficient to remedy
any errors made by the State Division. Id. at 272 n.9. But see note 59 and accompanying text
infra.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The .. .judicial proceedings of any court of any . ..State, Territory or
Possession. . .shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the
court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court
that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such . . .judicial proceedings . . . so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
[Vol. 52:320
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obligation upon the federal courts to give a state court judgment the
same effect it would be afforded by the rendering jurisdiction. 6
Section 1738 becomes operative upon a finding of finality at the
state level. Recalling its conclusion that the finality element with
respect to res judicata had been satisfied, the majority reasoned
that the touchstone of section 1738's applicability was fulfilled by
the explicit prohibition of further legal actions contained in the New
York Human Rights Law. 27
While the court observed that satisfaction of the requirements
of res judicata and section 1738 would usually lead to dismissal of
the action, it recognized that the presence of a clearly defined coun-
tervailing federal policy would preclude such a result. 2 Thus, the
majority addressed Mitchell's policy arguments in order to deter-
mine whether there existed a compelling reason for allowing review
of the claim at the federal level. Judge Mishler acknowledged that
other courts have held that compliance with the deferral policy of
Title VII, under which a complainant must pursue his state admin-
istrative remedies before commencing a federal action, 29 will not
foreclose a subsequent Title VII suit." The court reasoned, there-
fore, that if state administrative proceedings were held to bar a
section 1981 claim, the effect might be to force aggrieved individuals
to choose between filing a complaint with the state agency, in order
to preserve their Title VII action, and pursuing a claim in federal
court under section 1981.1 This, the Mitchell court found, would
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) gives a state judgment res judicata effect so as to bar a
subsequent suit on the same cause of action in federal court. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 39-
40 (1938); American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932); American Mannex Corp.
v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 689-90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Lynne Carol
Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1972); 1B MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.40611] (2d ed. 1974).
17 553 F.2d at 274. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
11 553 F.2d at 274. See Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951), wherein the
court stated: "[Ries judicata, as the embodiment of a public policy, must, at times, be
weighed against competing interests, and must on occasion, yield to other policies." Accord,
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971); 1B MoORE's FEDERAL PRAMCrCE 0.405[11] (2d ed. 1974).
See note 31 infra.
: 553 F.2d at 274 & 275 n.13.
" Id. at 274-75. Under the deferral provision of Title VII, if the state in which the alleged
discriminatory act occurred has enacted a law prohibiting such acts, and has created a local
agency authorized to receive complaints, the complaint must be deferred to that agency and
no federal charge may be filed until the expiration of 60 days or the termination of the state
proceedings, whichever occurs first. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975). The Mitchell
court pointed out that the State Division received the complaint on Dec. 3, 1973, and dis-
missed it more than 60 days later on Feb. 11, 1974. Nonetheless, it was observed that Mitchell
19781
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contravene the legislature's intention that civil rights claimants be
permitted "'to pursue independently [their] rights under both
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.' "32 Ac-
cepting the argument that deferral would also be desirable in the
context of a section 1981 claim, Judge Mishler nonetheless reasoned
that such a deferral policy could be fully satisfied without requiring
claimants to pursue state remedies beyond the administrative
level. 3 Although federal policy therefore would militate against bar-
could have filed a charge with the EEOC and commenced her § 1981 action before the
proceedings at the State Division had terminated. 553 F.2d at 275 n.12. Later in its opinion,
the majority stated that its decision to apply res judicata is consistent with the rule it has
applied to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which proscribes deprivation of constitu-
tional rights under color of state law. That rule requires resort to state administrative pro-
ceedings under certain circumstances. 553 F.2d at 276. While the court gave no definitive
answer to the question whether resort to state administrative machinery is required as a
prerequisite to a § 1981 action, the foregoing dictum seems to indicate that the court assumed
that such a requirement exists. A majority of the federal courts addressing the more general
question whether the full panoply of Title VII remedies must be pursued prior to the filing of
a § 1981 claim, however, have answered in the negative. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524
F.2d 263, 274 (10th Cir. 1975); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1974);
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1974); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co.,
443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International
Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971); Wageed v. Schenuit Indus., Inc., 406 F.
Supp. 217, 221 (D. Md. 1975). But cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester
Co., 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (plaintiff must plead
reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
It should also be noted that the continued vitality of the deferral requirement established
by the Second Circuit for § 1983 actions in Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973)
and Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970), has been
cast in doubt by subsequent decisions. See Cordova v. Reed, 521 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1975);
Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1975); Plano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 553 F.2d at 274 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974)). In
Gardner-Denver, an arbitration determination adverse to the plaintiff had been rendered.
The collective bargaining agreement between the defendant-employer and the plaintiff's
union stated that the arbitrator's decision was to be final and binding on all parties. In
plaintiff's later suit under Title VII, the district court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and dismissed the action, reasoning that the plaintiff had made a voluntary
election of remedies. 415 U.S. at 39-43. Rejecting this rationale, the Supreme Court dismissed
at length the policies underlying civil rights legislation and the intent of Congress to ensure
the availability of multiple remedies in discrimination situations. The Court also noted that
"in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to
another." Id. at 47-48. Thus, it was concluded that the arbitral decision was not binding and
that de novo review by the district court was warranted. Id. at 59-60. For a further discussion
of Gardner-Denver and its applicability to Mitchell, see notes 45-48 and accompanying text
infra.
11 553 F.2d at 275. The district court in Mitchell apparently was of the opinion that
pursuit of available state judicial review is required by the deferral provisions of Title VII:
Thus, this court is presented with the narrow issue. . .of whether a state adminis-
trative and judicial proceeding, instituted pursuant to required state exhaustion
under Title VII . .., has a res judicata effect barring later action . . ..
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ring a section 1981 suit solely because a prior administrative deter-
mination had been obtained, these policy considerations, the major-
ity found, are not an obstacle to the application of res judicata when
the plaintiff has chosen to seek review in a state court.34 In the
"absence of countervailing policy considerations," the Second Cir-
cuit majority concluded that the interests of finality, certainty, and
conservation of judicial energies dictate that Mitchell's action be
dismissed.35
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Feinberg argued that there ex-
isted strong federal policy reasons for overriding the mandate of
section 1738 and the doctrine of res judicata. 31 In the dissent's view,
Congress had intended to afford employment discrimination claim-
ants "ultimate resort to the federal forum" because of its recogni-
tion that "'federal rights are best adjudicated in federal forums' -13
and that inadequacies encountered at the state administrative level
diminish the ability of agencies to deal effectively38 with discrimina-
tion claims. Judge Feinberg found unpersuasive the argument that
these considerations were inapplicable to a section 1981 claim. 9 He
went on to reject the majority's conclusion that the occurrence of
state court review is dispositive, pointing out that since the appel-
late division's scope of review is strictly limited by statute, Mitch-
ell's claim had not been reviewed de novo by a judicial body." To
give preclusive effect to the state proceedings under these circum-
stances, the dissent declared, would do violence to the congressional
intention that administrative determinations of employment dis-
. . . It would be anomalous to argue that the very state proceeding that is
required by Title VII bars the contemplated federal remedy under Title VIi.
418 F. Supp. at 463 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
11 553 F.2d at 275-76. The Mitchell court specifically left unanswered the question
whether res judicata would have been found applicable had the instant action been brought
under Title VII. Id. at 275 n.13. Shortly after Mitchell, a district court within the Second
Circuit, in Al-Hamdani v. State Univ., 438 F. Supp. 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), was presented
with that precise question. Pointing to the express reservation of the question in Mitchell
and the strong policy favoring federal court review of Title VII claims, the court ruled that
the plaintiff is not bound by the state determinations. Id. at 302.
" 553 F.2d at 276-77.
Id. at 277 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 278 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 521, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
11 Id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 278 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). The dissent felt that the district court's reasoning,
which would force the plaintiff to choose between the remedies provided by Title VII and §
1981, was convoluted. Judge Feinberg stated that a "coherent interpretation of the two
statutes" demands that the same policy considerations be applied in actions arising under
the two legislative schemes. Id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 278-79 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
1978]
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crimination claims be "subjected to intensive scrutiny in the federal
courts." 4
It is submitted that the Mitchell court's analysis of the relevant
policy considerations was unnecessarily narrow. In its examination
of Mitchell's arguments, the Second Circuit limited its discussion
to the desirability of deferral to state agencies.4 2 Gleaned from the
provisions of Title VII, this policy, which the Second Circuit found
applicable in the context of a section 1981 claim, 3 reflects a congres-
sional desire to encourage utilization of existing state administra-
tive machinery in combating employment discrimination. As a re-
sult of its focus upon administrative proceedings, this consideration
would have supported a decision to allow Mitchell's 1981 action only
if she had not originally appealed beyond the administrative level. 4
41 Id. at 279 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). In addition to the narrowness of the review ob-
tained by Mitchell from the appellate division, Judge Feinberg pointed out that at both the
State Division and Appeal Board proceedings she had not been represented by counsel, and
that the State Division's investigation had been limited in scope. Id. at 278 (Feinberg, J.,
dissenting). The dissent concluded that, under these circumstances, de novo review of the
claim in a federal forum was a necessary safeguard. Id. at 280 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
4 See id. at 274-76.
553 F.2d at 274-77. There are several reasons for looking to Title VII policies for
guidance in § 1981 actions. Foremost among these is the fact that § 1981 was passed more
than 110 years ago and its legislative history, therefore, is of little assistance in determining
the relationship between the federal remedy and recent state enactments. In addition, there
is a paucity of cases involving the procedural aspects of the statute, because it was not until
after 1968 that § 1981 was recognized as a remedy for private acts of discrimination. See note
3 supra. Since that time there has been less utilization of the statute by civil rights claimants
than had been anticipated. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 80, 84
(1973).
The Mitchell court assumed for the sake of argument that the same policy considerations
"underlying the treatment of state proceedings in Title VII claims are desirable in a § 1981
context." 553 F.2d at 275. This approach appears sound, since both statutes are designed to
achieve the same goal, i.e., elimination of discrimination. In Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), however, the Supreme Court employed language which may
tend to confuse this issue. The Johnson Court held that a timely filing with the EEOC, as
required by Title VII, does not toll the running of the statute of limitations on a § 1981 claim.
Id. at 455. Finding that § 1981 and Title VII seek to accomplish the same goals, the extensive
substantive and procedural differences between the two nonetheless led the Court to conclude
that they are "separate, distinct, and independent" and must be treated as such. Id. at 461.
It is submitted, however, that, in the interest of ensuring full utilization of both statutes,
Johnson should not be read as precluding the application of Title VII policy considerations
in § 1981 actions. Accord, Miller v. Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837, 839 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1976). See
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974), wherein the court
stated: "[I]n fashioning a substantive body of law under section 1981 the courts should...
look to the principles of . . . Title VII for direction." See generally Note, Employment
Discrimination-Statute of Limitations Under Section 1981 not Tolled by Filing of Charges
with EEOC under Title VII, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 288.
1 Although the court did not expressly state that an unreviewed administrative determi-
nation would not bar a § 1981 action, it did point out that "[rles judicata attached when
the plaintiff chose to pursue her claim in the state courts, and not before." 553 F.2d at 276.
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Since Mitchell's claim was in fact reviewed by a state court, the
Second Circuit's decision to preclude her later 1981 suit would
therefore be unassailable absent further apposite policy considera-
tions.
Several federal courts have refused to bar civil rights actions
commenced after the conclusion of apparently binding state pro-
ceedings, however, relying upon policies not discussed by the
Mitchell majority. 5 For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.," the Supreme Court considered the res judicata effect of an
arbitral decision upon a subsequent Title VII claim.4 7 Rejecting a
contention that the plaintiff voluntarily had elected to pursue the
arbitral remedy and thereby had waived his federal claim, the Court
emphasized that Congress intended Title VII to serve as an indepen-
dent remedy and placed final responsibility for its enforcement in
the federal courts." Added impetus for allowing the claim to be
reviewed de novo in the district court was the realization that the
arbitral mechanism, which lacks the procedural rules and safe-
guards available in the federal courts, is a less desirable forum for
the final adjudication of Title VII claims." In Voutsis v. Union
Less than 2 months after the Mitchell decision, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York was presented with a § 1981 claim where the plaintiff had exhausted her state
administrative remedies but had not appealed to the appellate division. The defendant's
contention that res judicata should bar the later § 1981 action was rejected on the basis of
the judicial-administrative distinction drawn by the Mitchell court. Stewart v. Wappingers
Cent. School Dist., 437 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Prior to Mitchell, three district courts had held that a prior state administrative determi-
nation does not bar a § 1981 suit. See Miller v. Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1976);
Wageed v. Schenuit Indus., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 217 (D. Md. 1975); Hollander v. Sears, Moe-
buck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
"5 See cases cited in note 5 supra; notes 46-54, 64 and accompanying text infra.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
7 See note 32 supra.
" 415 U.S. at 51-52. The Gardner-Denver Court recognized that Title VII provides the
aggrieved party with several forums in which relief may be sought: the EEOC, state and local
agencies, and the federal courts. The Court went on to find that Congress had intended to
allow a civil rights claimant to pursue his remedies under any other applicable statute: "The
clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement . . . existing laws and institu-
tions relating to employment discrimination." Id. at 48-49. Supporting the Court's analysis
are the House and Senate reports on the Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Act
of 1971, wherein it was clearly indicated that neither Title VII nor its amendments were
intended to displace any other remedy. H.R. REp. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971);
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
11 415 U.S. at 57-58. The Court pointed out many of the undesirable aspects of the
arbitral process:
[Tihe factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial fact-
finding. The record of the . . . proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process, cross examination, and testimony under oath, are
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Carbide Corp., 0 a case somewhat analogous to Mitchell, the Second
Circuit was faced with the question whether a settlement effected
by the State Division should bar a later suit under Title VII.5 ' Up-
holding plaintiff's right to de novo review, a unanimous court" ex-
plained that the broad "Congressional policy here sought to be en-
forced is one of eliminating employment discrimination;" to that
end, an independent federal remedy is available "if the state machi-
nery has proved inadequate."53 Underlying the congressional deci-
sion to provide an independent federal remedy, the court observed,
was a recognition that state fair employment agencies are often ill-
equipped to deal effectively with claims of discrimination. 4
often severely limited or unavailable. . . .Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral
procedure that. . . makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution
of Title VII issues than the federal courts.
Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted).
Many of these same undesirable qualities are also found in proceedings conducted by the
State Division. See Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 521, 523
(E.D.N.Y. 1974). Thus, it is clear that Mitchell was not afforded the safeguards that are
available in a federal forum. For example, she was not entitled to subpoena witnesses. See
State Div. of Human Rights v. University of Rochester, 53 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1020, 386
N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (4th Dep't 1976) (mem.) (claimant's attorney may not issue subpoenas
until full hearing is held). Had the case proceded to a full administrative hearing, the hearing
examiner would not have been bound by the usual rules of evidence. [1977] 9A-1 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 465.10(e)(1)-(7). Moreover, as the New York courts have critically noted, the proceedings
conducted by the State Division are often unduly abbreviated. See, e.g., Tenenbaum v.
Division of Human Rights, 50 App. Div. 2d 257, 259, 376 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (1st Dep't 1975)
per curiam); State Div. of Human Rights v. Board of Educ., 46 App. Div. 2d 483, 486, 363
N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (4th Dep't 1975); Mayo v. Hopeman Lumber & Mfg. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d
310, 313, 307 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694-95 (4th Dep't 1970). These factors, together with the fact
that Mitchell was unassisted by counsel and that only informal conferences were held dur-
ing the investigation, militate against the court's conclusion that Mitchell's claim was dis-
posed of in a manner similar to the disposition of a motion for summary judgment by a federal
court.
so 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
11 In Voutsis, a settlement had been negotiated by the State Division which, despite
the passage of 2 years and 2 appeals to the appellate division, remained unenforced. 321 F.
Supp. 830, 831-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In plaintiff's Title VII suit, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, of res judicata. Id. at
833.
3, Sitting on the Voutsis panel were Judges Feinberg and Lumbard, both of whom partic-
ipated in Mitchell. It is interesting to note that while Judge Lumbard joined in the unanimous
rejection of the res judicata defense in Voutsis, he opted for the application of that doctrine
in Mitchell.
'4 452 F.2d at 893. Although it is uncertain whether the result would have been different
in Voutsis had the state courts handled the appeals in a more expeditious manner, the court
did imply that even where relief is granted at the state level, a subsequent federal action
might not be precluded: "While plaintiff may ultimately achieve some individual relief in
the state proceedings . . ., the federal claim allows the district court to conduct a 'full scale
inquiry into the charged unlawful motivation in employment practices.' "Id. at 893 (quoting
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968)).
, The Voutsis panel declared:
[Tihe purposes underlying enactment of that Title were clearly based on the
19781 SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
The foregoing cases illustrate the general consensus among the
federal courts that Congress intended to provide effective remedies
in the area of employment discrimination. 5 Consistent with this
objective is the provision of an ultimate federal forum, a forum
which Congress felt would best safeguard individual rights." A
major factor militating in favor of access to the federal courts, more-
over, was the belief that the procedures employed by the typical
state administrative body would not prove adequate to redress un-
fair practices." Although these considerations were articulated in
the context of Title VII actions, a number of district courts have
found them applicable in section 1981 suits and therefore have re-
jected res judicata defenses.58
It is submitted that the factors which have led these courts to
congressional recognition that " . . . state and local FEPC laws vary widely in
effectiveness. In many areas effective enforcement is hampered by inadequate legis-
lation, inadequate procedures, or an inadequate budget. Big interstate industry
cannot effectively be handled by the States."
Id. at 894 (quoting statement of Sen. Clark, reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1290 (1970)).
0 Relying upon the broad remedial purposes of Title VII, courts have held that a finding
of probable cause by the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a suit under
Title VII, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970), that a prior determination by an arbitrator will not
bar a Title VII action, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), and that a prior determination by a
state administrative agency will not bar a subsequent suit under Title VII, Batiste v. Fumco
Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975); Cooper v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Benneci v. Department of Labor, 388 F. Supp.
1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ferrell v. American Express Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 521
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Young v. South Side Packing Co., 369 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
" See cases cited in note 5 supra. In Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 449
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 428 (1975), the plaintiff had received a favorable
determination at the state administrative level. In rejecting the defendant's attempt to in-
voke the doctrine of res judicata, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the overriding congressional
intention that "final responsibility for the administration of Title VII rests within the federal
system." Id. at 450.
In contrast to Mitchell, the plaintiff in Batiste had received a full hearing and had
prevailed at the administrative level; yet the Seventh Circuit refused to foreclose the later
federal action. Although the action in Batiste was premised upon § 1981 as well as Title VII,
no mention was made by the court of the possibility that the § 1981 claim was barred.
Apparently, no circuit court has been confronted with the question whether res judicata
bars a Title VII action where the appellant has obtained judicial review of the initial state
administrative determination. Several district courts, however, have held that neither a §
1981 nor a Title VII action would be barred in such a situation. See note 63 infra.
W See note 54 supra.
u See, e.g., Crouch v. United Press Int'l, No. 74-296 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1977); Miller v.
Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1976); Wageed v. Schenuit Indus., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 217
(D. Md. 1975); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975); Carrion
v. New York Univ., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5992 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); note 63 infra.
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conclude that an ultimate federal remedy should be afforded both
Title VII and section 1981 plaintiffs are particularly relevant to the
factual setting of Mitchell. While Mitchell's claim was investigated
by the State Division, it was done so on an informal basis; a full
hearing was never held. In addition, review by both the Appeal
Board and the appellate division was confined by statute to the
narrow question whether the finding of no probable cause by the
State Division was arbitrary, capricious, or constituted an abuse of
discretion." While Mitchell's complaint was heard, the only factual
inquiry ever undertaken was the limited one conducted by the State
Division." Since the state court's review of the agency decision was
severly restricted and therefore can be said to have added little to
the sufficiency of the state proceedings as a whole, the res judicata
requirement that the claimant be found to have had a full and fair
opportunity to present her claim must in this instance find fulfill-
ment in the administrative proceedings. That application of res
judicata in civil rights cases cannot rest on the weight of an adminis-
trative determination has been definitively stated by many federal
courts and was conceded by the Mitchell court." Thus, in view of
the fact that the Second Circuit inquiry into the sufficiency of the
state proceedings was focused upon the administrative component,
it is difficult to reconcile the court's decision with such cases as
Gardner-Denver and Voutsis.
Admittedly, it is questionable whether a federal court would
adhere to the philosophy that "federal rights are best adjudicated
in federal forums" if faced with a prior state court determination in
which a full scale inquiry had been conducted upon the factual
merits of the claim. That situation might well be found to present
5, See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7803(3) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 297-a(7)(e)
(McKinney 1972); Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 304 N.E.2d 231, 349
N.Y.S.2d 364 (1973), wherein the New York Court of Appeals stated:
The scope of. . . review by the board. . . would have been limited to whether the
decision of the commissioner was "arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." This would seem to
contemplate the limited scope of review familiar in article 78 proceedings. . . . The
scope of review in the Appellate Division could scarcely be any broader than that
of the appeal board.
Id. at 57, 304 N.E.2d at 233, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68 (citations omitted); accord, State Div.
of Human Rights v. Mecca Kendall Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 201, 202-03, 385 N.Y.S.2d 665,
666-67 (4th Dep't 1976); State Div. of Human Rights v. Board of Educ., 46 App. Div. 2d 483,
486, 363 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (4th Dep't 1975); Long Island R.R. v. State Div. of Human Rights,
42 App. Div. 2d 857, 857, 346 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.).
" See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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an acceptable alternative to review in federal court.12 Since Mitch-
ell's claim, however, was never adjudicated on its factual merits by
any judicial body, the Second Circuit's decision seems to conflict
with congressional intent and to ignore the basic assumption under-
lying Congress' decision to provide for the final adjudication of civil
rights claims in the federal courts."
David Lesser
12 In discussing whether the procedures provided by a state statutory scheme may serve
as an acceptable substitute for federal review, the court in Tooles v. Kellog Co., 336 F. Supp.
14 (D. Neb. 1972), stated:
[If the State machinery contained the protections for the plaintiff and possible
remedies provided by the Federal statute, then a prior state decision should be
entitled to a res judicata effect in the Federal action, assuming all the usual require-
ments for res judicata are met. If, on the other hand, the State's protections and
possible remedies were narrower than the Federal relief, then the Congressional
purpose is not allowed to be diminished by the action of the State and the extent
of the res judicata effect of the prior State decision would have to be decided...
according to how close the State's possible relief approximated that of the Federal
statute.
Id. at 17.
1 Prior to Mitchell, three district courts had found res judicata inapplicable in the
context of § 1981 and Title VII suits, even though the plaintiffs in those actions had obtained
state court review of the initial administrative determination. In Carrion v. New York Univ.,
4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5992 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the plaintiff had prevailed at the administrative
level. The defendant thereupon petitioned a New York trial court, which reversed and dis-
missed the complaint on the merits. The appellate division affirmed the reversal and the
court of appeals denied leave to appeal. Id. at 5993. The district court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's subsequent § 1981 and Title VII actions on the basis of the
decision in Voutsis, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra. Id. at 5994. In Benneci v.
Department of Labor, 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the district court denied defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment although the claim had been previously reviewed by
the State Division, the Appeal Board, the appellate division, and the EEOC. Relying upon
the interpretations of congressional intent expressed in Gardner-Denver and Voutsis, see note
54 supra, the Benneci court concluded that the appellate division's review was too limited in
scope to bar the plaintiff's Title VII action. More recently, in Crouch v. United Press Int'l,
No. 74-296 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1977), the court rejected a claim of res judicata on two grounds:
that a contrary holding would force plaintiffs to choose between a Title VII and § 1981 action,
and that the state proceedings, taken as a whole, did not afford the plaintiff a "full and fair
opportunity" to present his claim.
